The 2011 Congress on Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Nancy, France)

In honor of World Logic Day today, Valeria de Paiva has organized a bunch of people to write up informal reports of various meetings of the Congress on Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, organized via the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science and Technology. (See a list of past congresses here.) I volunteered for the 2011 congress for two reasons: First, it’s the only one I’ve ever been to! And second, it holds a very special, personal place in my life.

The 2011 congress was held in Nancy, France, from 19 to 26 of July, organized by Gerhard Heinzmann and his team. I was invited to participate in a workshop within this congress on Logical Modeling: The Interface Between the Formal and the Empirical, and I gave a paper on “Faithfulness: On the proper method of building formal models for pre-modern logical theories”, building on my post-doctoral research, under the supervision of Benedikt Löwe, in logical and formal models and medieval logic. I remember being grateful for having the workshop-within-a-congress to present in, because the overall congress was rather overwhelming — so many people, so many talks I wanted to go to! It was an incredibly rich week with always something interesting to do or someone interesting to talk to.

As part of the conference, the organizers made arrangements with photographer Olivier Toussaint to come and photograph the conference, as part of a project he was doing on portraits of science. He could be seen with his huge camera lenses floating throughout the conference, capturing both candid photos and posed portraits.

What made this congress so special for me on a personal level is that this was the first conference I went to where I was so obviously pregnant that people assumed my news was commonly knowledge; I was five and a half months pregnant, but at a conference only two weeks earlier everyone was very oblique and circumspect, not wanting to presume. There in Nancy, there was no need to presume, it was obvious fact! When Toussaint discovered that there was a young! female! pregnant! logician present at the conference, you could see his glee — I would make a great addition to his collection because there’d be no one else like me in it. 🙂 I was delighted when he asked if I would sit for him for a post portrait, not only for the vanity of being a part of this collection, but also because there was one thing during my pregnancy that I had not been able to organize for myself and did not know if it would be able to do before my daughter was born, something that would have been routine if I were still living in the US but which just seemed so daunting to try to do as an immigrant, and I had quietly given that up as “not for me”, with no small amount of sadness: A maternity photoshoot. And then here comes this entirely unexpected opportunity, to have some professional photos taken of me while pregnant, but photos of me and not my pregnancy. It was an opportunity to celebrate the diversity of the field of logic, and also to commemorate this special moment in my life.

So those are my personal recollections of that congress, and why it was such a meaningful moment for me.

Sara L. Uckelman
(c) 2011 Olivier Toussaint

Excerpt from the interview I gave as part of the portrait series:

What is your opinion about your portrait?

Part of the reason that Mr. Toussaint asked if he could photograph me is that, at the time, I was about 6 months pregnant.

As an academic and a soon-to-be mom, I know that figuring out how to balance these two aspects of my life may, at times, be ­complicated, yet I feel it is very important that I do so. Attending the Congress while pregnant was a step towards creating the new me which can successfully balance both work and home life, and Mr. ­Toussaint’s portrait of me, even if it does not physically display this stage of my life, provides me with a symbol of the success of that first step. It makes me excited and optimistic for the future, and I’m very happy to have such a lovely memory of a special time in my life.

View the entire portrait exhibition.

How do we (teach students to) ask questions?

Yesterday I gave a talk with this title at Nottingham Philosophy’s departmental colloquium. The post below isn’t a transcription of the talk but it’s the notes I wrote up on the train down which I mostly followed when speaking. I’m reproducing the notes here unchanged, not because I didn’t get loads of useful feedback from the Q&A, but because I don’t have the time to amend/augment it now, and in any case I’m planning to take this and try to turn it into an actual journal paper.


I’d like to thank Matthew and the rest of you for the invitation to come give a talk, because it gives me an opportunity to explore some things that I spend a lot of time thinking about but which I feel like we (as a profession) spend very little time talking about – either with each other or with our students. I know from Matthew and Ian that Nottingham is a very open and pluralistic department, so I wanted to do something a little bit different. This is going to be more of an interactive exercise where I get you guys to think reflectively about a bunch of stuff and then share your thoughts with each other and with me. It’s primarily selfish in nature: I want to get better at this, so I want to get as much different input as I can.

What is philosophy?

  1. Is it content?

    Is it about who our predecessors are, and what they thought? Is it names, dates, influences, concepts, theories, questions, applications, problems, paradoxes? [If it is, what distinguishes philosophy from history of philosophy?] Is it about investigating fundamental reality?

  2. (2) Is it method?

    Or is it method? Can any topic be philosophical so long as we apply certain kinds (the right kinds?) of methods to it?

    What are the methods? Formal logic; informal logic; concept analysis; phenomenology; thought experiments; etc.

One needn’t place themselves firmly in one camp or the other – it’s possible to take any position on the spectrum between these two extremes, and probably most philosophers find themselves somewhere in the middle. But if hard pressed to come up with a means of excluding philosophy from non-philosophy, each of you will end up favoring one side or another.

Why is it important to know where you stand on this issue? It’s because it relates to another topic, namely:

What are we teaching when we teach undergraduates philosophy?

  1. Is it philosophy?
  2. Is it how to be a philosopher?

These are not quite the same question as the previous question, but if you say the answer is (3) then whether you take (1) or (2) will make a difference.

Think back to your own undergraduate career. What did you learn? What courses were you required to take? In the US, I had to do history of ancient and history of modern; I had to take at least one ethics course; I had to take at least one logic course. For the rest, I had choice, but the classes I took tended to focus on particular areas/subfields/figures in philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein; philosophy of language; metaphysics; epistemology; philosophy of math. As I got higher up (and started taking grad classes) I got focused topics like compositionality and vagueness and logicism. But there was a very clear sense that we were learning who the important figures, themes, concepts, developments in philosophy were. In only one case did I get the feeling that my professor was teaching me what he was teaching me because he thought it was right (Terry Penner doing Plato was amazing.)

If there was an expectation that we would learn how to be philosophers, it was that this would fall out of reading and seeing how the great philosophers did philosophy. (This is, if you think about it, an interesting pedagogical assumption. Would we expect people to learn how to become engineers by reading/seeing how other engineers do engineering? Would we expect people to learn how to write fiction by reading/seeing how other authors write fiction? It’s a pedagogical technique that seems more appropriate in some cases than in others, and not appropriate across the board: So we must ask the question, “Is it appropriate for philosophy?”)

Does anyone else’s experiences differ from mine?

Anyway, the takeaway I took from this, as a student, is that this is what I was supposed to teach my own (undergraduate) students – that there were certain figures, concepts, disputes, etc. that any student having gotten a philosophy degree should come away with some degree of knowledge/familiarity with. (Let me just say as an aside here that this is where questions of canon come in…questions I’m not going to talk about so much, but not because I don’t think they’re important.) So if I was teaching philosophy of language, I should teach people about Frege/Sense/Reference; Russell/Donnellan/Kaplan/definite descriptions; Kripke; possibly Geach. Maybe at a higher level I could teach semantics, and compositionality, and theories of truth.

That’s what I should teach…but what I really wanted to teach was all the ways in which philosophy of language gets fiction wrong, and how to deal with lies, and what do we mean by “meaning” and “nonsense” and “meaningless”, and the problems fanfiction causes. But if I did that, then I’d have to give up on giving them the broad foundation in the historical debates and developments – there simply isn’t enough time.

But what if what we were really supposed to be doing was teaching students how to do philosophy or how to be philosophers?

Then all the things I wanted to be teaching them and talking to them about, I could. But if that’s what our goal is, then I think for the most part, we don’t do a very good job at it.

In my capacity as director of undergrad dissertations at Durham, the biggest thing concern I’ve seen over the years is that students don’t really know how to come up with dissertation topics. They look at the grand topics they’ve covered in their classes – the problem of evil, why is there something rather than nothing, what are numbers, etc. – and worry (quite rightly) that (a) they can’t come up with a grand topic like this; (b) if they do, they won’t be able to come up with an original contribution; (c) if they do, they can’t adequately discuss it in 12k. Or, they look at the sorts of essay topics they’re given in their classes or exams, and try to come up with something that sounds like that, and invariably end up with something clunky, awkward, and not very much fun.

My first experience with teaching (UK) students how to come up with their own questions was a few years ago when I taught a 2nd year course on Language, Logic, and Reality. I talked with the other person running the module and we agreed on a plan. The course had one formative paper and two summative papers. The formative paper, we would give them one question – everyone had to write on it. (It tied back to the very first lecture when I wrote three quotes up on the board – one in medieval Welsh, one in Sindarin, and one in Linear B. We asked them whether the quote in Linear B was meaningful, and why/why not.) The second paper we had around 7 pre-set questions students could choose from. But their final paper, they had to come up with their own topic. We told them this at the very beginning of the year, and provided a lot of “and this would be an EXCELLENT topic for your final paper” during lectures and discussions. We also arranged for my students to talk to the other lecturer to get their questions vetted, and vice versa, so that no one ended up picking something unreasonable for 3000 words. These final papers were across the board a much higher quality than the other ones.

But I can’t recall how many people I had in my office telling me things like “I didn’t know that I could talk about X in philosophy” or “Is this philosophical enough?” (Those two words are the bane of my existence). The worry whether something is “philosophical enough” connects to a concern that philosophy is demarcated by its subject matter, rather than its method, and that if one wants to talk about something in a philosophical context one must relate it back and anchor it in that subject matter. Whereas if one things that philosophy is a matter of method, then anything can be philosophical enough. It was working with students that convinced them that method is the way forward, and that method is what we should be teaching them, and what we should be teaching them explicitly.

(Side note: As a graduate student in the US, I remember being utterly baffled how my compatriots wrote journal articles. How did one come up with an idea that was suited to an article? I didn’t have much problem writing seminar papers, but journal articles seemed a very different thing, and not once did I get any explicit guidance as to what the difference is or how I should approach one vs. the other.)

So how do we teach students to ask questions? Well, here’s how I teach them:

When students are in my office wondering what to write their dissertations on, I have a surefire method of finding them a topic that excites and interests them. First, I ask them what interests them outside of philosophy. What do they read, what do they listen to, what do they watch, what do they talk about with friends, what are their hobbies? [Only once did I have a student tell me he had no hobbies.] Then, I ask them what interests them in philosophy – is it ethics, is it metaphysics, is it epistemology, is it language/logic? That is…are they interested in what is right? What is? What we know? How we say true things about it/draw inferences about it? Finally, I ask them: What’s in the intersection. There’s your thesis topic.

But that just gets a topic. How does one know what to say about it? These are the questions I have them go through:

  • What do you want to know?
  • What would count as an answer to this question? How are you going to discriminate between things that answer the question and things that don’t?
  • What would count as a good answer to this question? How are you going to discriminate between competing answers? What are your foundational principles, the things that you cannot give up? What is the purpose of this answer (are you looking for something functional, moral, epistemological, etc.)? State these at the beginning of what you are writing, as part of your motivation.
  • Then, once you’ve answered the question…who cares? Why does it matter? What has changed as a result of having this answer? What must change as a result of having this answer? Does having this answer affect our behavior? Does it affect what philosophical position we must adopt to remain consistent? Does it change the philosophical landscape by either removing or adding possible positions? What difference does it make?

These are, at the heart of it, the questions I think philosophers should be asking, whatever other questions they ask. Do not ask “Why is there something rather than nothing?” or “What is a fact?” unless you have some idea of what could possibly count as an answer, and some idea of what could possibly count as a good answer. And when it’s boiled down to this, these are fairly straightforward things to teach students to ask.

Answering them, on the other hand… is another matter altogether.

It shouldn’t be like this

Yesterday afternoon I went down to Leeds to give a talk at the joint Mathematics/Philosophy Logic seminar.

It was, in almost all respects, a really lovely day. I know the Leeds campus quite well, having been going to the International Medieval Congress there quite regularly for the last 10+ years, and I realised on the train down that I think I’ve probably been to Leeds more often than any other university in the UK other than Durham. I got in a few hours early, and hung out in the Old Bar to finish up my slides. (It was very strange, being on the Old Bar and not having it overrun with medievalists. I didn’t overhear any conversations about transcribing codices, or rants about sexuality in Arthurian lit.) While sitting there, a friend surprised me by finding me there, and we got to chat for half an hour or so before I headed over to the mathematics dept., where another friend was waiting to join the audience of the talk. There were also a number of other people that I’d met at the British Logic Colloquium in September, which when sprinkled throughout the rather large audience made me feel at ease. I then got to give one of my favorite talks to mathematical logicians — in it, I try to convince them that they should care about medieval logic, and show them amusing and sometimes rude pictures from manuscripts (my slides are here. There was a lot of enthusiastic nodding during the talk, and some excellent questions at the end. Afterwards, a third friend of mine turned up, and joined us for beers, and then the dept. took me out for dinner — so, basically a really, really wonderful day out.

Except.

I was the only woman in the room.

We all know that philosophy has a gender problem, that math has a gender problem, and that logic, sitting in the uncomfortable intersection between math and philosophy, has inherited the worst of both worlds. There have been many contexts in which I’ve been one of only two or three women in a group of logicians, and when I was an undergrad and early grad student, this was so normalised, to be honest I hardly even noticed. (To also be honest, I rather liked the skewed ratio, because it gave YoungNerd!Sara members of the opposite gender she could actually talk to and who actually wanted to talk to her. Dear reader, I married one of them.) But this was the first time where I was the only one.

During dinner I pointed this out, and to their credit, the people I was having dinner with fully acknowledged that this was a problem, and also that it is not an accident that they have invited as many women to come speak as they have. The first step towards fixing a problem is recognising it.

But even so, I wonder when the last time one of them gave a talk to an audience that was only women. It’s 2019. It shouldn’t be like this.

Doctor Logic Goes to WorldCon!

Edit August 1: The final schedule is now up, and I can confirm that the below is all correct.

I am super excited to be going to my first WorldCon, in Dublin next month. It’ll be an interesting adventure — it’s my not only my first WorldCon, but it’s also my first SFF con of any type, and while there I’ll be participating in events that feature many different facets of my life. I’ve got lodgings arranged with philosophy and NaNoWriMo friends; I’m giving a paper on onomastics in the academic track; I’m speaking in two panels on AI; and I’ll be participating in the demos and display stalls for the Society for Creative Anachronism; and I’ve got a drink-beer-with-an-author session. All my academic, hobby, and authorial pursuits all coming together into one!

So, what, exactly am I do, and where can you find me? Here’s the scoop!

Thursday, August 15

11:30-12:50: Worlds (Academic Session)

Names: Form & Function in Worldbuilding & Conlangs

Significant interest has been generated in recent years in the robust development of conlangs (constructed languages) for fantasy and sci-fi purposes, with detailed handbooks now available for the amateur conlanger, providing instructions on how to develop grammar, phonology, etc. One area of linguistic development that many conlangers often overlook is personal and place name patterns and practices.

The influence of medieval European naming practices can be seen throughout contemporary fantasy naming practices. This influence can be traced back to the Father of Fantasy, J. R. R. Tolkien, as many of his names – such as Gandalf, Thorin, Frodo, Theodred, and Peregrine – are in fact genuine medieval names; and Tolkien himself was significantly influenced by the medieval-style romances of William Morris. However, unlike Tolkien and Morris, many modern authors developing ‘generic medieval European’ style fantasy worlds do not have a background in medieval history or linguistics, with the result that even dedicated conlangers approach names in an unsystematic or ungrounded way.

In this talk we argue for the importance of including personal names and place names in the development of fantasy worlds and languages, and highlight the distinctive aspects of the formation and function of personal and place names that conlangers and authors should be aware of when developing a world or a language. We also show how resources available to the amateur historian and linguist, such as the Dictionary of Medieval Names from European Sources, can be used to develop consistent, grounded, systematic name pools and patterns of construction.

Date, Time, Location

15 Aug 2019, Thursday 11:30 – 12:20, Odeon 6 (Academic) (Point Square Dublin)

Speakers

  1. Dr. Sara L. Uckelman – ‘Names: Form & Function in Worldbuilding & Conlangs’
  2. Andrew Richardson – ‘Civilisation and Science Fiction’
  3. Dr Kevin Koidl – ‘Trust and the Future of Social Media’

Friday, August 16

16:30-17:20: Is Hari Seldon’s project becoming achievable? (Panel)

People have long tried to predict future outcomes of nations or personal behaviour. Prediction is now enhanced by big data and machine learning. Panellists consider which events we already can predict with high probability. With stochasticity, which events will we never ‘get’? What mechanisms would prevent misuse (e.g. for advertising or influencing voting)? What would trigger a ‘Seldon Crisis’?

Date, Time, Location

16 Aug 2019, Friday 16:30 – 17:20, Alhambra (Point Square Dublin)

Panelists

  1. Shmulik Shelach
  2. Dr. Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University)
  3. Tomasz Kozlowski (Atelier of Improvisation) (Moderator)
  4. Marina Berlin

Saturday, August 17

15:30-16:20: Crafting your fandom (Panel)

From building a spaceship wardrobe to knitting the Doctor’s scarf, baking the Death Star, or putting their travel cards into wands, fans have ever more inventive ways to express their love, enthusiasm, and fandom through arts and crafts. Our panellists will share their love of fandom crafting from what they do to how they do, and discuss why we all do it.

Date, Time, Location

17 Aug 2019, Saturday 15:30 – 16:20, Alhambra (Point Square Dublin)

Panelists

  1. Dr. Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University) (Moderator)
  2. Todd Allis
  3. Arwen Grune
  4. Michelle Coleman (University of Nottingham)
  5. Alicia Zaloga

Sunday, August 18

17:00-17:50: Society for Creative Anachronism (demo)

Date, Time, Location

18 Aug 2019, Sunday 17:00 – 17:50, 4th floor foyer (CCD)

21:00-21:50: Literary Beer with Dr Sara L. Uckelman

Come and keep me company and have a beer (or not) and talk about writing (or not) or academia (or not)!

Date, Time Location

18 Aug 2019, Sunday 21:00 – 21:50, Liffey-A (Fan Bar) (CCD)

Monday, August 19

10:30-11:30: AIs and the female image (Panel)

Whether in smart homes or wearing mechanical bodies, until recently many ‘female’ AIs emphasised beauty and sexuality. Now some portrayals emphasise strength and intelligence. Can we do both? How does the representation of ‘male’ AIs differ? Must we anthropomorphise AIs and assign them genders? Can we have non-binary AIs?

Date, Time, Location

19 Aug 2019, Monday 10:30 – 11:30, Odeon 1 (Point Square Dublin)

Panelists

  1. Madeline Ashby
  2. Charles Stross
  3. Pat Cadigan
  4. Dr V Anne Smith (University of St Andrews)
  5. Dr. Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University)

It may come as a surprise to some people that I am actually an introvert and sometimes can suffer from incapacity shyness and anxiety. I’ve spent a large part of my life thinking “Surely everyone has someone they would like to talk to more than talk to me”. But if people come up and talk to me, I am positively delighted and often can pretend very well to be an extrovert. So look out for these shoes and introduce yourself to me if you see me! (And if there is someone else at WorldCon with these shoes…I want to meet you.)

April Writing Wrap-Up

April was an odd month. First, there was Easter and the concomitant holiday. Then, the last of my four deadlines was April 6, which meant a furious week of nonfiction writing. After that it was one weekend conference followed by another conference the end of the next week, and another the weekend after that. Because I was going to be working two whole weekends as a result, I took three days off while G was still out of school. Then my term started up again, and so did all the admin work. So it was swings and roundabouts when it came to what I was writing and then; still, I managed an average of 846 words a day, and wrote at least 5 days out of every 7, which, considering all the conferences and childcare, I feel is damn good.

Overall, I wrote just over 25k, my 2nd most productive month of the year so far. I think what makes me happiest about the month was that I managed to complete short stories for two deadlines. Both of them I finished on the day, so in May my goal is to finish one BEFORE a deadline; but considering that one of them I only realised 6 days previously that I needed to rewrite it from the POV of a different character, and I wrote the bulk of it while on the train up to St Andrews the day before it was due (and the day it was due found me getting up early to bang away in my hotel room before the conference started — AND staying up late after the conference dinner to finish it!), I’m just thrilled I finished it.

Looking at the bar chart, it feels strange that I wrote so little nonfiction; it felt like my Easter break was way more productive than that stat displays, but I think what’s tripping me up is that most of my Easter term productivity happened in March!

I’ve got two more teaching days this week, and then exam season starts. I’ve already started concocting grand plans for my summer productivity…bring on May! In the next few days I intend to write up my grand plans, because there’s nothing like public accountability to keep me going.

Conferencing with a kid: An experiment

Last week I conducted an experiment.

When I contemplated the path of academic motherhood, I had starry-eyed dreams of traveling to exotic places and bringing my child with me, of giving her the opportunity to go to countries she wouldn’t otherwise go to, and to build up some special mother-daughter experiences of a lifetime with me.

In slightly more rational moments, I knew that such dreams don’t just come true on a whim, but need to be worked towards. G. has been integrated into my research activities from the start; her first academic event was Latin reading group when she was 11 days old, and her first conference was when she was a few days shy of one month. While I usually leave her behind when I travel, I have accepted some invitations to speak on the condition that accommodations for her be included in the accommodations for me. I’ve hired childcare on the other end, with the help of local friends. I’ve flown my mom over from the US to meet us in Portugal so she could watch G. for me; I’ve brought my husband with a couple of times; I once replied to an invitation to speak with the suggestion that if the budget covered it, they also invite him because we both worked on the same project and we could both speak on different aspects of it. But since she stopped being a sleeping babe in arms, I’d never brought her to a conference without any childcare provisions.

She’s 5.5 now, and just finished up her first year of school, meaning she has a full year’s worth of understanding of sitting still, being quiet, listening to others, and asking questions — which is basically what a conference is. I’d already been away for three conferences since the beginning of June, so when I was making plans to go to the Time and Modality workshop in Bonn last week, it occurred to me that I should bring her with.

This seemed like a good venue for experimenting, a relatively short workshop with a smallish group of people, many of them I have known for a long time. If worse came to worst, I could skip a few talks and wander the city with G., but what I hoped was that she would be able to sit with me and learn how to be a conference participant. We had a long talk about proper conference behavior, and I asked her if she still wanted to come with, and she said she did. In exchange, I went armed with everything I thought would help make things go smoothly. We brought plenty of books, three brand-new new coloring books, as many stuffed toys as she could fit in her suitcase, and I promised that in the afternoons, she could watch a movie or two on my laptop.

And she did brilliantly. I’m not sure I have ever been so proud of my daughter. Our plane was delayed so we didn’t get to Bonn until the end of the first day of talks, but we joined the group for supper, and she sat and colored and didn’t complain even though it was long past her usual supper time, and we didn’t get back to the hotel until long past bedtime. (Repeat this refrain for the next two evenings!). The next day, she spent the entire morning sitting quietly next to me, or under the table, coloring, and during the coffee breaks she gave out colored pictures to each of the participants. In the afternoon, she sat in the anteroom of where we were, and watched movies, and then came and sat on my lap while we played pen and paper games that didn’t involve any talking. Rarely did she interrupt me (e.g., for the bathroom), and she always slipped into the room and came to me as quietly as possible. The next morning, my talk was the second one of the day. It was an hour-long talk (including discussion), and she was an absolute star, sitting and coloring near the front of the room (and then eventually sitting next to one of the participants who kindly started coloring and making paper rabbits with her), once or twice come over for a hug. (I’ve long learned how to continue lecturing on logic in the midst of hug interruptions.). In the afternoon we settled her in the office of one of the organizers — rather far away from where the workshop actually was, but because it was a weekend the building was empty, and we practised the trip back and forth so she knew how to come find me if needed — and the quiet time (in a much cooler place than the actual venue!) was really useful as it perked her up enough to be able to survive another late night.

Some observations drawn from this experiment:

  • Having lots of conversations in advance with G. about what conferences are, what would happen at them, what proper conference behavior is, and what my expectations of her was really useful. She rose to the occasion admirably because she knew what was going on and what she needed to do.
  • If you miss the talks on the first day of a conference, and then show up to join the group for dinner with a child in tow, someone will assume that you’re someone else’s +1 (or +2 in our case!); I’m sure the fact that I was a woman contributed to this.
  • 5 year olds are very good at spotting gender disparities at conferences. That first dinner, there was ~15 of us, and G. loudly announced at one point, “Mummy, there’s only THREE girls! You, me, and that lady!”
  • Things were a bit better during the days, with more women in the audience, but I had a startling realisation on the last day of the conference that I — 35 years old, on the cusp of getting of the UK equivalent of tenure — was the senior woman at the conference. That is the topic for another post, but when I realised this, I realised how much more significant it was that I was there with my child.
  • If you take a child to a conference, no matter perfectly well behaved they are, you will never be able to do enough to feel entirely comfortable. There is only so far you can go, and the other conference participants have to go the rest of the way in order to make things work. Luckily, people here did.
  • So, you’re at a conference where someone else has brought their child. What can you do do go the rest of the way? Plenty:
    1. If you’ve ever brought your child to a conference, tell the parent this. It’s amazingly reassuring to hear retired senior men recount stories of when they brought their child to conferences with them.
    2. Volunteer to read to the child during, e.g., lunch. Not only will the child love having someone read to her, the parent will appreciate the change to have an uninterrupted conversation with fellow participants!
    3. If the child is well behaved, tell the parent this. Though G. was always quiet as a mouse when she would interrupt me, it was hard not to feel like I was a distraction when I’d slip out to take her to the bathroom. Having someone say “My kids are her age, I don’t think they would have done anywhere near as well as she’s done” means a lot.

There were a couple of “above and beyond” encounters that also contributed to this being such a positive experience. One fellow parent happily colored with G. during my talk (he was also the one who then read to her during lunch; after this, G. announced to him, “I want to stay with you FOREVER!”), and he also said “next time you see my name on the programme of a conference you’re going to with G., tell me, and I’ll bring my kids.” THAT is one of the best things that can be done, to help normalize such situations. Not everyone has the luxury of bringing their children with you; sometimes, it’s a necessity (it wasn’t a necessity for me, this time, but there have been other times). If you do have that luxury, exercise it. This helps make it more accepted for those who have to do it. Here’s a place where using your privilege can actually benefit those with less privilege.

All in all, the experiment was a rousing success. I’m glad we did it, and look forward to when we get to do it again (because it will only get easier).

Writing like Hemingway…or not

I spent the last couple of days in Oxford at a Fiction Writing for Philosophers workshop (at which I gave a talk arguing that plot is argument and argument is plot; more on this in another post here within a few weeks, I hope). Thursday morning the keynote speaker was James Hawes, who gave us a brief writing assignment part-way through.

We were given the opening paragraphs of Heminway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls:

He lay flat on the brown, pine-needled floor of the forest, his chin on his folded arms, and high overhead the wind blew in the tops of the pine trees. The mountainside sloped gently where he lay; but below it was steep and he could see the dark of the oiled road winding through the pass. There was a stream alongside the road and far down the pass he saw a mill beside the stream and the falling water of the dam, white in the summer sunlight.

“Is that the mill?” he asked.

“Yes.”

“I do not remember it.”

“It was built since you were here. The old mill is farther down; much below the pass.”

He spread the photostated military map out on the forest floor and looked at it carefully. The old man looked over his shoulder. He was a short and solid old man in a black peasant’s smock and gray iron-stiff trousers and he wore rope-soled shoes. He was breathing heavily from the climb and his hand rested on one of the two heavy packs they had been carrying.

And then we were told to rewrite it, but using our own story and own characters. By “rewrite”, we were instructed to follow the structure of the sentences one by one: The first one beginning with a pronoun (not a name! not a description!) and an action, with a specification of the action, and a description of the setting. The second sentence needed to be an expanding on the description, and involve a passive action on behalf of the initial character. The third sentence needed to be more description, but slightly more poetic and fancifcul, with a repetition of the action. Then the first character had to ask a question; an unnamed character had to answer; the first character reply; and the second elaborate. The first character then needed to do an action with a prop, and the second character act and then be described.

The point was to show how through quiet economy of language and setting of scene, one can evoke sympathy for a character by starting at a bird’s eye approach and then zeroing in to the details, with some action.

I found the exercise infuriating.

My first thought was that I would try this task with one of my current short stories being drafted, because I have been struggling with it and thought maybe this might get me unstuck. But that was a resounding “no” from the very first word, when I would have had to decide between “He” and “She”. See, one of the things I’m doing this story is seeing how far I can get without ever explicitly confirming the genders of any of the characters. So the Hemingway-route is right out for that story.

My next thought was that I would try rewriting the prologue of The Novel in this style, especially because the prologue already has some superficial similarity in initial structure. That was also very quickly a “no”: First, because the prologue is in the present tense (for a very specific reason), and changing it to the past just isn’t an option. Second, because there is no dialogue in the prologue, and this is again for a very specific, plot-governed, world-building reason.

Since the prologue didn’t work, I figured I’d try rewriting chapter 1, since in that chapter things actually happen, there is a location and an action and two characters and a discussion. I followed the template, and what I came away with was so awkward and static and so unexciting. In the actual chapter, Luneta comes sweeping in to Duska’s office and spreads her maps on the table with a flourish, announcing that they are finished before Duska can even inquire. There is a sense of vibrancy and action and vitality. We do not know why it is important that the maps are finished, but we do know that it is important that they are.

In the end, I wasn’t all that surprised that my Hemingway-esque rewriting fell so flat, because I actually think the original opening is pretty flat. What I found most useful about the exercise was articulating why Hemingway just doesn’t do it for me. (It’s not just this chapter; I haven’t read Hemingway since university, but I remember being mostly unmoved by him then. A Moveable Feast I remember being better than the others, though.) (1) The omniscient perspective doesn’t allow me any access to the character’s heads, what they are thinking, what they are feeling. I am not intrinsically motivated by the actions of men, so simply having them converse does not make me interested in them. (2) Description. All the description. The light glinting on the water and the wind blowing through the trees and the brown leaves…I don’t need it. I realized at one point while drafting The Novel that there was a marked lack of description in it (unless we are talking about ecclesiastical architectural details). One of the main characters has zero physical description; the only thing that is ever said explicitly about him is that he is young and he is male. When I realized this, and I realized I wasn’t writing it because I didn’t know what to describe or where to put the description, I started paying attention to where and how description appears in the books I like to read, to see if I could get guidance from that. And I found something very interesting: I don’t actually read description. If it’s more than a sentence or two, I just skip over it until I’m back to the characters. It just doesn’t interest me, and there are two reasons for this: (a) I just don’t see it. For the most part, the sort of details that are being described in descriptive passages are details that I just do not see when I navigate through my (actual) world. (You can ask my husband about the sheer quantity of things that I do not notice about household details — whether we have skirting board, what color it is, what type of profile it has, what color the door frames are, etc., etc., etc. I just don’t see it). (b) I can’t generally reconstruct a mental picture from a spoken description, whether this is a description of a person or a place. So both coming and going, description doesn’t do it for me, for the most part. (3) The general lack of urgency about any of it. I have been given absolutely nothing in this opening to make me excited about the characters, or to make me worried about them — which is funny, because this was given as an example of an opening that gets the reader emotionally invested from the start.

The final interesting thing that came out of this exercise was the number of other people who participated in it who also said that Hemingway does very little for them!

What interdisciplinarity looks like

I had a very varied day today.

A colleague in classics and I hope to become the co-directors of a new Center for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy in Durham (the meeting to approved the center will be next week, and we’ve been assured it’ll happen, but it isn’t official yet). We met this morning for our first “directorial” meeting, to discuss what we want to do, assuming we get approval, to launch the center in fall. There was a lot of discussion of what sorts of philosophy cut across both the ancient and medieval periods so that we can truly get our two departments (plus history and theology) all involved.

In the afternoon, I’d arranged to meet someone in the algorithms and computation group, who is interested in having Durham host Computability in Europe here in 2019. I haven’t been to CiE since 2010, but when he approached the governing board of the conference series, someone on it suggested he get in contact with me, as someone who wants to promote the profile of logic in Durham. So we had a lively discussion about model checking and logics for verification and descriptive complexity.

In between the two, I popped by the library to pick up an ILL book, containing the diary of an early 15th century Florentine shipping captain.

Afterwards, it was back to my office to do some quick fact checking in Harry Potter and the Cursed Child for a student of mine working on logical models of time-travel, and then prepare to give a seminar on recursive sets and recursive functions.

Yeah. This is what interdisciplinarity looks like.

What it’s like to be THIS woman in philosophy

Gather ’round and make yourself comfortable, because this is going to be a long one…

Tuesday afternoon I got back from 10 days in Australia, a trip which involved three back-to-back conferences and which gave me three very different views of being a woman (or at least, being THIS woman) in philosophy (let me make it clear, here and now, that this post is going to be about ME and MY experience, not generalities about “what (all) women do/be/are in philosophy”; in fact, these generalities are precisely one issue I will be railing against). The first conference was the annual conference of the Australasian Association for Logic, and the primary reason for the trip, as I was invited to give the keynote (you can read a summary of the talk over on the Medieval Logic and Semantics blog). The second conference was the annual conference of the Australasian Association for Philosophy, a generalist conference which basically accepts all abstracts submitted. I figured, since I was going, I might was well present, and submitted a non-logical abstract. The third was the annual conference of the International Association for Women in Philosophy, which I did not present at because the deadline for abstracts was long before I made any of my plans to go. All three conferences took place in the same city, with the second two being at the same campus.

The AAL conference was great — a passel of fascinating talks, getting to see some friends I haven’t seen in years, getting to meet in person people I’ve previously only known over the internet, and getting to meet new people. It was small enough that everyone got to talk to everyone, and the talks were long enough to really be able to say something, and have time for good discussion. It was basically everything I want in a conference. One sad part was that a friend I’d been looking forward to seeing was unable to come at the last minute, which had an added consequence that the number of women speaking at the conference went down from 3 to 2. Luckily, the organizers were able to find a replacement for the talk, and because gender imbalance in logic is something the organizers care about, they made sure it was a woman. So, there were three of us speaking, and another three women in the audience (out of around 20-30 people total). These are not good numbers, but they aren’t horrible.

The AAP conference was huge, and I was glad I went into it with a core group of friends collected from the AAL, including one of the other women speakers. The first evening of the conference, there was scheduled a reception for Women in Philosophy at one of the local pubs, and upon viewing this on the schedule, she and I had one of those “Are you going?” “I dunno, are you going?” “I don’t really want to go if I’m going to be the only one.” “I’ll go if you go.” sorts of conversations. Neither of us had an inherent desire to go to the event because of the type of event that it was, but we both felt that, as women in philosophy, there may have been some sort of obligation on us to attend, because it’s an event that’s organized specifically for us — and wouldn’t it be a bit churlish not to go? But as the afternoon waned on, we talked more, and we agreed: Neither of us really fancied the idea of going and hanging out with a bunch of people we don’t know simply because they’re the same gender as us (especially when, given our druthers, we’d rather hang out with people of the opposite gender). So we instead went out to a different pub with a mixed group, and proceeded to have a very interesting conversation about whether or not we actually had an obligation that we were shirking by not going to the Women in Philosophy reception — a very interesting conversation that included both men and women, something that almost by definition could not have happened if we had gone to the reception, and which had two interesting results. One, one of the men involved relayed how in previous years, the reception has explicitly excluded men, which meant that while it was going on, the men gathered in another room of the pub, and there — without the tempering effect of women — conversation degenerated into the worst of belligerent agonistic philosophy. Thus, while women only events in philosophy may be beneficial for women in philosophy, one might wonder whether they are beneficial for philosophy. Two, we came to the conclusion that neither of us had an obligation on behalf of ourselves to attend the event: If we did not think the event would be beneficial for us, then there was no obligation on us to attend. (Whew! That meant I could enjoy my company and my beer and not feel guilty). However, there remains the issue of whether we might have obligations towards others to go — to other women in philosophy. In particular, it is unlikely that there would’ve been any other female logicians at the event (which was one of the reasons we weren’t that interested in attending in the first place); however, what if there were a young female graduate student interested in doing logic, but unsure of the advisability of pursuing it, perhaps because of gendered reasons, and who would perhaps have benefited from going to such an event and seeing some more senior (how on earth have I moved into the “senior academic” category? I think it’s the grey hairs) women logicians? I know that I personally never felt the lack of senior female role models — all my best teachers and role models were men, and this never bothered me or seemed problematic — but I also know that I cannot consider myself typical (in fact, I think I am extremely atypical, and also a combination of extremely lucky and extremely oblivious. I have followed What’s it like to be a woman in philosophy? for years, and I have read the stories there with a sense of disconnect with (my) reality: I could not identify with a single story written there. I finally submitted my own a few days ago. Take a look at the title they gave it. Isn’t that sad?). Since I cannot assume that my case is typical, I should assume that there are others out there who would benefit from having someone like me around. Do I have an obligation to them to attend such events? In the end, the group had a strong argument to the conclusion that “while members of oppressed groups may have a responsibility to resist their own oppression, they don’t have a responsibility (simpliciter) to resist the oppression of others in the oppressed group”. Even though that conclusion excluded me of any responsibility to attend the event, I’m a little bit hesitant to assent to it. I think I do have an obligation towards these amorphous, indistinct others, but I don’t have a good sense of how this translates into concrete action, i.e., which women in philosophy events I can skip and which I can’t. (In the end, I did have one good reason why I was not obligated for this particular one, at least not as strongly as maybe for some: Events like this are often about networking, and given that the network most useful for young philosophers there to be plugged in to was the Australia/New Zealand one, since I’m not a part of that network, I wouldn’t be able to contribute much.)

Hold that last thought, because it’s important later on. The AAP itself was pretty well gender balanced, at least from what I could tell of the composition of the coffee breaks, and also all the keynote talks and special lectures were given by women, which is pretty cool. Given that, it’s interesting that at least three of the contributed talks I went to (there may have been more, but I only noticed/counted in these three), I was the only woman in the room; usually, one out of 8-10, but in one of them, it was one out of 20. All three talks were on topics in logic and philosophy of language, reinforcing my belief that if I had gone to the reception, I would’ve been unlikely to find anyone doing what I do to talk with.

The final day of the AAP was the first day of the IAPh, and the two conferences shared a round table, “30 Years of Women and Philosophy”, to be live-streamed on a radio station. Still being somewhat uncomfortable about having opted out of the reception, I figured I would go to that, especially when a friend said he thought he’d go. It was a bit awkward, though, because we weren’t sure if this was something like the reception — was it a women only event? would he be excluded, implicitly or explicitly? — but when we poke our heads in the room, there were a handful of other men, so he gamely followed me in.

The discussion was actually focused on the 30th anniversary of a special issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy on Women and Philosophy, with a number of the contributors to the journal there to reflect on how things have changed (or not) for women in the discipline in the last 30 years. I ended up finding the entire event profoundly uncomfortable. There were a number of times in which “areas that women work on in philosophy” was equated with “feminist philosophy”. Hello! What does that make MY work? Or what does it make ME? Once one of the speakers trotted out the “men are mind/thinking/rationality, women are “body/emotion/irrationality” trope in order to rebut it, but the way she rebutted it was not by saying that women can be mind, but by saying “women have brought the body into philosophy!” — while I sat in my chair shrinking into myself and thinking “but what if I want to be mind?” As my discomfort grew, I started posting about it on social media, e.g., a quote from FB:

I came away from this roundtable with a profound feeling that if this is what Women and Philosophy is, then the only logical conclusion is that either I am not a woman (or the right kind of woman) or what I do is not philosophy (or not the right kind of philosophy).

By the time the IAPh fully got going the next day (Friday), I’d been conferencing for more than a week with only 1.5 day break over the weekend, so I fully recognize I didn’t go into the conference in as charitable mood as I might have, but even so, I found the first day that there was basically no intersection between what was going on and what I was interested in. Almost no one that I knew from the AAP stayed on for the conference; there was no logic at all; and the history of philosophy track started off with one talk that briefly named a few people from the 15th and 16th C, and then everything else was early modern or modern. And again and again the equations of male = rational, female = irrational came up:

Now, in each case, they were brought up to be rejected, but I experienced that perverse psychological effect whereby simply bringing something to attention, even if it is to be rejected, has the consequence of reinforcing it. Maybe (some) men act as if male = rational and female = irrational, but if so, their actions never affected me in the way that women saying these things did. (Cf. comment above about obliviousness. I don’t want to say that misogyny didn’t/doesn’t exist in any of my academic homes; but one advantage of being socially awkward is that transgressions of social norms sometimes simply don’t even register.) The tipping point came the second day, during the Q&A of one of the keynotes. The talk was on women in the history of philosophy and the entire period from 400-1500 was basically skipped with one throwaway mention of Hildegard of Bingen and one of Christine de Pisan (Eloise didn’t even get a name check!!), because these were the “Dark Ages”, there was no education, there was no development in philosophy. I tried to push back against these ideas (not the least the fact that “Dark Ages” as a term is highly deprecated amongst medievalists!), and had my very first experience in academic philosophy of being talked over by a senior academic. Even when I said quite explicitly “May I please finish my question?”, that didn’t work. I have never been talked over like that before, ever, and really didn’t know how to respond. A number of people came up to me afterwards and offered support, and in the end I ended up sitting with some very excellent women at the conference dinner, and had a good time. The final day was also better than the previous two — there was actually two talks on philosophy of language (one of them given by the sole male speaker, and one of only two men who attended the conference), and a few people I’d struck up conversations with during coffee breaks the day before seemed keen to continue engaging, and I ended up having a very interesting discussion with one until the end of the final reception.

One other way in which the conferences differed, which may seem a minor thing but in fact I think is not so minor at all, was that there was a distinct lack of beer involved with the IAPh:

With the AAL and the AAP, every evening after the talks were over, a group of us would gather for beer and food, or food and beer, depending on the time we got started, varied up one night with a trip to a whisky bar and capped off with karaoke until 2am after the AAP conference dinner. I like beer. I like drinking it, I like talking about it with others (during the pre-conference-dinner beers, I ended up sitting next to someone from Australia who was at the same beer festival in the Netherlands that I was at in 2014), I like hanging out with people who like beer, and I like the opportunities to hang out that beer involves. It gave us a common purpose — as the sessions wound down for the day, we’d gather in the common lobby, wait for a critical mass, and then go out and socialize. That didn’t happen at the IAPh, and I can’t really imagine how it would. Now, I know that the presence of alcohol is often a problematic factor in mixed-gender-social-philosophical gatherings, but I also think it can play a very valuable role in bringing people together.

It was interesting, following up some of the conversations started by posts on twitter and FB, particularly with a few other women (mostly of the logical bent, unsurprisingly!) who have experienced similar feelings of alienation or discomfort. A few of us decided we needed to start a club for women philosophers who are not “women in philosophy”:

I don’t have any grand thoughts or conclusions, but I did think it important to write all of this down and document it. If I didn’t, I would continue to stew about the experiences, but hopefully now I can put them behind.

Monday, September 22, 2014

Reading

  • Read Student & Departmental Handbook.

Writing

Revising

Refereeing

  • Sought another referee for JoLLI.

Teaching

Conferences

  • Read up on admin stuff related to research committee and ethics committee.
  • Asked Parul to make hotel arrangements for AREW.

Miscellaneous

  • Scanned some papers.